This data set includes all 72 civil wars initiated between 1940 and 1992. These cases were selected based on the coding criteria proposed by the University of Michigan’s Correlates of War (COW) project. To be included as a civil war a conflict had to (1) occur within a generally recognized state, (2) produce at least one thousand deaths per year, (3) involve the national government as an active participant, and (4) experience effective resistance from both the rebels and the government. Variables were coded using multiple sources, the most common of which were Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, the CIA World Factbook, The International Review of Peace Initiatives: Accord, SIPRI Yearbooks, Ruth R. Sivard’s World Military and Social Expenditures; Guy Arnold’s Wars in the Third World Since 1945, The Central Intelligence Agency’s, World Factbook; Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Conflict Since 1945, Hugh Miall, The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes since 1945; the United Nations Department of Public Information, and the Economist Intelligence Unit. In addition, the coding of each variable was checked against multiple historical accounts. When existing literature was unclear or specific information was unavailable, country experts were consulted.

For a more detailed account of the methods used to code each of the following variables as well as a bibliography see Walter, Barbara. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

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1 This includes civilian as well as military deaths.
2 This rule was relaxed in those cases where no national government existed at the time war broke out, as was the case in Angola in 1975 after the Portuguese withdrew from its colonies, and Algeria in 1962 after that country gained independence from France.
3 Two modifications were made to the list of civil wars recorded in the Correlates of War dataset. First, COW codes a civil war as having terminated once the number of deaths per year falls below 1,000 in any twelve-month period. If fighting resumed on the thirteenth month and produced a thousand war deaths in the next twelve-month period, COW coded this as a new civil war. The civil war in Laos, for example, experienced a nine-month lull in the fighting between June 1962 and March 1963, dropping the number of people killed below 1,000. When fighting resumed in 1963, COW recorded this as a new and separate civil war. I did not continue this coding practice in order to avoid biasing the data with multiple observations of long-standing stop-and-go wars. Instead, the Civil War Resolution Dataset records recurrent civil wars (such as the war in Laos) as a single, continuous case. Six out of the seventy-two civil wars were coded this way (China, Colombia, Laos, Guatemala, Angola, and Liberia). Second, COW coded Nigeria as experiencing a civil war between 1980 and 1981. I could find no information on this conflict in any of the general reference books on civil wars, and only an occasional mention of it in detailed histories on Nigeria. This made it impossible to obtain sufficient information for coding, and was the reason I did not include this case in the analysis.
PEACEPROCESS: A single categorical variable that included four outcomes: no negotiation, active formal negotiation, a signed bargain, and a successfully implemented settlement. Detailed descriptions of how each of these categories was coded are as follows:

*No Negotiation versus a Formal Attempt to Negotiate*

Civil wars were first distinguished based on whether combatants were willing to initiate formal negotiations to end their war. A war was coded as having experienced negotiations if three criteria were met: (1) the leaders or representatives of each of the main fighting factions met in face-to-face talks, (2) these individuals were willing to discuss both a ceasefire and a political solution to the war, and (3) their respective factions had the capabilities to continue the war if talks broke down.  

I chose these three criteria in order to distinguish real negotiations designed to end a war and rebuild a country from the many negotiations that often occur during civil wars but have little to do with seeking a solution to a conflict. The first criterion ensures that leaders themselves were interested in peace and were willing to publicly pursue such an end. The second criterion eliminates meetings where no substantive issues were discussed, where delegates refused to talk to each other, or were only interested in discussing the terms of a ceasefire. The third criterion separates negotiations that were real attempts to cooperate between relative equals who still had the strength to return to war, from one-sided talks designed to dictate the terms of surrender. These latter negotiations are more aptly classified as capitulations or surrenders. Wars that did not meet these requirements were coded as having experienced “no negotiation”.

*Signed Bargain*

A third category was constructed to determine under what conditions civil war combatants are willing to reach and sign a mutually-agreeable bargain. A case was coded as having reached a “signed bargain” if two criteria were met. First, the combatants were able to agree on a comprehensive peace plan that included a political as well as a military solution to the conflict. The Riyahd agreement signed in October 1976 between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Lebanese government, for example, was not coded as a signed bargain since it dealt only with the military aspects of the civil war and made no reference to the.

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4 Data on negotiation attempts were obtained from Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Arnold (1995), Goldstein, 1992; Miall, 1992, Brogan, 1990 and individual case histories.
political and religious issues that incited the war. Similarly, signed agreements that only included terms for a ceasefire (even if combatants were willing to discuss larger political issues during negotiations) were not included since these were intended only as temporary measures to stop the fighting and not serious attempts to resolve the underlying differences that had ignited the war. The fourteen-point ceasefire agreement signed between King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO in September 1970 is an example of a treaty not included in this category because it failed to address any of the political issues that instigated the war. Finally, treaties that only mandated the withdrawal of foreign troops, or offered amnesty for soldiers were also not coded as signed bargains since their objective was to allow foreign states to exit gracefully, or present a coup de grace to losing parties. In this way, I distinguished comprehensive peace settlements designed to end a war from treaties that offered no long-term solution to the conflict. Not all signed treaties, therefore, that might be referred to as “peace agreements,” “peace plans,” or “peace accords” in historical accounts of a war were coded as such.

Second, a peace treaty had to be signed by all combatants actively fighting a war not just a subset of actors.\(^5\) If one of the main warring factions refused to sign a treaty or was prevented from signing by other actors, this treaty could not be considered a genuine step toward peace and it was not recognized as a signed bargain. The settlement signed between Rhodesian President Ian Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa in 1978, for example, ushered in the country’s first black-led government but excluded the Patriotic Front, the main rebel faction, from the plan. This was not coded as a signed bargain. Similarly, the 1973 peace agreement signed between the North Vietnamese and the United States was also not coded this way because it excluded both the South Vietnamese Government and the National Liberation Front from the talks.\(^6\)

**Successfully Implemented Settlement**

Finally, a civil war was coded as ending in “a successfully implemented settlement” if the signed bargain ended violence for at least five years, and if the combatants made good faith efforts to execute the terms of the agreement during this time. A five-year time frame is the standard measure of treaty success used in the literature. If a formal peace treaty broke down within five years of being signed, it was considered a failed attempt and the outcome in these cases was coded on the basis of the

\(^5\) An exception was made in two cases (Yemen 1970, and Lebanon 1958) where no written agreement existed. In these rare cases, warring factions bargained for and agreed to very specific political and military arrangements without inscribing a written document.

\(^6\) This treaty also did not meet the first criteria of a “signed bargain” since it was mainly an agreement about the withdrawal of U.S. forces and not a comprehensive peace plan.
eventual military results. Although peace treaties were signed in China, Laos, Philippines, Angola, Afghanistan, Chad, Uganda, Somalia, Liberia, and Rwanda, the terms were either never implemented or only partially implemented and almost all broke down into renewed civil war within a year. This five-year cut-off gives combatants a reasonable amount of time to attempt to implement the terms of their agreement.

A five-year measure, however, does not fully capture the progress combatants are making towards peace or whether they are willing to take the hard steps necessary to rebuild the country and bring lasting peace. It tells us whether the government and rebels were willing to stop fighting, but not whether they were willing to take the much more difficult step of disassembling their partisan armies and opening up the government in ways dictated by the peace treaty. This is the more difficult type of cooperation I hope to understand.

In order to distinguish between those cases where the combatants are willing to implement a wide range of terms from civil wars where they are willing to stop fighting but nothing more, I added a second criterion for success. This second criterion, whether the combatants made good faith efforts to implement the terms of the settlement, was slightly more ambiguous to code. There are many civil wars where the combatants implement the terms long after the scheduled timetable for implementation or never completely implement the terms of settlement. In El Salvador and Nicaragua, for example, the FMLN and contra forces did not fully adhere to the demobilization timetable. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge signed the Paris Peace agreement but then boycotted the 1993 elections and returned to war leaving the remaining factions implement the treaty.

The minimum requirement necessary to be classified as a “good faith effort” was the installation of one part of the political agreement (either the installation of the transitional government or the formation of a new national government) and at least partial demobilization. In most cases the combatants either made no attempt to implement any of the terms (China, Laos, Afghanistan, Uganda, Somalia, Liberia) or at best implemented only parts of the military or political terms, but not both (Philippines, Chad, Rwanda, Angola).

Based on these criteria, thirty five civil wars never experienced any negotiation attempts (49 percent), fourteen civil wars had formal negotiations but the combatants failed to reach an agreement (19 percent), ten reached a signed bargain but were then never implemented (14 percent), and thirteen made it all the way through to a successfully implemented settlement (18 percent). Cases that did not end in successful

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7 Violence was considered to have ended if fewer than 1,000 war deaths occurred each year for a period of five consecutive years.
implementation were coded based on highest stage the combatants had attained in the four-stage peace process.

**DURATION:** The Duration of war was measured as a continuous variable and ranged from a low of one week (.25 months) to a high of 396 months. (Source: Correlates of War Data Set through 1992, and updated through December 1999 using sources listed above.)

**BD1000:** The number of war-related deaths was measured as a continuous variable that ranged from a low of one thousand deaths in Indonesia in 1953 to a high of more than a million and a quarter deaths during the Chinese civil war.\(^8\) (Source: Correlates of War Data Set through 1992, and updated through December 1999 using sources listed above.)

Dependable information on the number of deaths after 1992 could not be found for seven wars (Burma, Colombia, Georgia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Turkey). In these cases, I used an average of the deaths recorded by the Correlates of War through December 1992 to estimate the number of deaths that were likely to have occurred thereafter.

**STALDUM:** A dummy variable indicating whether a military stalemate existed at any point during a war. To determine whether a military stalemate existed, I sifted through reports and historical accounts of each of the wars noting each time the battlefield situation was described as “stalemated” or at an “impasse”. Although this measure is somewhat subjective, in most cases a consensus did exist among historians as to whether the fighting had ground to a halt. One source, for example, described the military situation in Paraguay this way: “Until the beginning of April (1947) the position was largely one of stalemate, with the insurgents holding the north of Paraguay and the Government retaining control in Asuncion and the south.”\(^9\)

A balance of power was coded in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>the presence of a military stalemate at any time during the war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>no military stalemate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^8\) It should be emphasized that accurate counts of war-related deaths are notoriously difficult to obtain. Many deaths go unreported, while others are either under or over-reported for strategic reasons. For a detailed discussion of how the COW project attempted to correct this problem, see Small and Singer pp. 70-77.

REGIMETY: An overall democracy-autocracy scale commonly used in the literature.\textsuperscript{10} It assigns two scores (0-10) to every country: one based on a government’s autocratic features, and one based on its democratic features.\textsuperscript{11} The incumbent government’s autocracy score is then subtracted from its democracy score to produce a net democracy number that ranges in value from very autocratic (-10) to very democratic (+10). Costa Rica received the highest net democracy score of plus ten during its 1948 war, while Iran received the lowest possible democracy score of minus ten during its 1978-1979 war. Most cases fell somewhere in between with an average score of 2.3. (Source: Policy III Data Set)

XCONST: A second measure of democracy was used to isolate the effect of executive constraints on a leader’s decision to negotiate or fight. The coding for executive constraints was based on the degree of operational independence the chief executive of a country enjoyed during the civil war and was also taken from the POLITY III dataset:\textsuperscript{12}

\begin{itemize}
    \item 1 = unlimited authority
    \item 2 = intermediate category
    \item 3 = slight to moderate limitations
    \item 4 = intermediate category
    \item 5 = substantial limitations
    \item 6 = intermediate category
    \item 7 = executive parity or subordination
\end{itemize}

A leader was classified as having “unlimited authority” if he or she could easily ignore constitutional restrictions on decision making, revise or suspend the constitution, if no legislative assembly existed or could be called and dismissed at the executive’s whim, if the legislature could not initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts made by the executive, if the executive could appoint and remove a majority of members of any accountability group at will, and if he or she repeatedly ruled by decree.\textsuperscript{13}

ETHNIC: A dummy variable indicating whether a clear ethnic division existed between the combatants. If the combatants broke down along ethnic lines, or that faction defined itself as a separate ethnic group, its war was coded as an ethnic civil war. All other wars


\textsuperscript{11} If there were a number of regime changes during the war, the case was coded based on the most democratic year, assuming that this would have been the moment at which combatants were most likely to settle.

\textsuperscript{12} If the amount of constraints changed during the war, I recorded the highest level of constraints. I once again assumed that a leader was most likely to negotiate a settlement at this point in the war.

\textsuperscript{13} For a more detailed description of the coding criteria see the Polity II codebook (limited revised edition, December 1997).
were coded as non-ethnic. The civil war between the Ibos and the Nigerian government (composed mostly of individuals from the Hausa and Yoruba tribes), the civil wars between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Burundi and Rwanda, and Iraq´s war against the Kurds are examples of ethnic civil wars. The civil war between the Communists and the Greek government, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, and the Conservatives and Liberals in Colombia are clear examples of non-ethnic civil wars.¹⁴

Wars were coded in the following manner:

0 = non-ethnic civil war
1 = ethnic civil war

**TOTALGOALS:** If the rebels initiated the war to obtain anything less than total control over the government (i.e., political reform, regional autonomy, or territorial secession), the war was coded as involving non-total goals.¹⁵ These conflicts were expected to have a higher rate of negotiated settlement than those fought in pursuit of more absolute goals since the rebels did not outwardly aim to eliminate their enemy. The Sandinistas demand for political reform in Nicaragua in 1978, and the JVP’s demand that all Indian troops be withdrawn from Sri Lanka in the late 1980’s are examples of civil wars fought for non-total aims. All other wars were coded as having “total goals.”¹⁶ Mao Tse-tung’s communist revolution in China, Greece’s revolution in the 1940s, and Uganda’s civil war where the rebels aimed to overthrow President Obote’s government are examples of total conflicts.

A word of justification is in order for why I selected the stated goals of the rebels as the primary basis for coding war aims. One could argue that the critical issue for divisibility is not the goals the rebels choose to pursue, but how these goals are perceived by the government under attack. If incumbent elites believe that democratic reform will remove them from power, they will behave as if this were a total goal regardless of how I code it. This is especially likely in cases where the rebels are aiming for majority rule and the government in power has only minority support. While this is a valid concern, I resisted coding goals this way for two reasons. First, in all but the most extreme cases (such as Zimbabwe where the white minority government represented only 3 percent of the

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¹⁴ Some cases, however, were difficult to classify since combatants frequently broke down along ethnic lines even if ethnic identity did not appear to be a salient issue of the war. Moreover, ethnic differences are almost always tied to broader political or economic grievances. The Angolan rebels, for example, drew their main support from the Ovimbundu ethnic group but defined themselves as fiercely anti-Communist, at least in the early stages of the war. Likewise, the civil war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 was fought between groups who many observers claim exhibited no clear ethnic differences. Although I was cautious not to overplay the ethnic component in any given case, Angola and Bosnia were both classified as ethnic civil wars since they fit the coding criteria described above.

¹⁵ Cases were coded based on the stated aims of the rebels at the beginning of the conflict rather than the stated goals of the government since it is the rebels who almost always initiate a war and are therefore likely to define its parameters.

¹⁶ I relied on an historical consensus rather than an operational criteria for this coding. See individual case sources in the appendix.
population), the incumbent government could still compete for political power and have a reasonable chance for success even if political reform deposed them in the short-term. This is clearly not a situation where one side aimed to eradicate the other even if it was an outcome the incumbent government would have preferred to avoid. Second, it is far more difficult to reliably assess and code “perceptions” than it is to code statements made by rebel groups on what they aim to achieve.

I did, however, make an exception in four cases. Rebels in four of the seventy-two cases (6 percent) aimed for political reform that clearly threatened to throw the ruling party permanently out of power: in Paraguay, the army demanded elections that promised to depose President Higinio Morinigo, in Zimbabwe, black majority rule would have ended white dominance in government, in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas demanded the resignation of President Somoza, and in Tajikistan, opposition groups called for the dissolution of the Supreme soviet and the resignation of President Nabiyev. In these cases it is almost certainly true that the government perceived the rebel aims and total and they were coded that way.

The extent of rebel goals was coded in the following manner:

0 = Non-total goals
1 = Total goals

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**TERRITORY:** A dummy variable indicating whether a war was fought for territorial or non-territorial objectives. Wars in which the rebels aimed to secede from the original territory or demanded territorial autonomy were coded as “territorial wars”. The widespread rebellions in Sumatra, Java, and the Moluccans in 1953 over home rule, and secession movements in Nigeria, Sudan, Congo, Pakistan, and the former Yugoslavia are examples of territorial wars. If the factions demanded control over the existing government rather than a share of territory, the conflict was coded as “non-territorial”.

Whether a war was fought for territorial or non-territorial objectives was denoted in the following manner:

0 = non-territorial wars
1 = territorial wars

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**DIV:** I constructed a somewhat rough measure of "divisibility" based on how easy it would be to divide the population and resources within a given state.\(^{17}\) The logic here is that in cases where territorial separation has already occurred and does not represent a large material loss to the government, it should be easier to settle a conflict. Division was considered "easy" if the fighting factions occupied distinct regions of the country and the assets and resources of the country were not concentrated wholly in one region or the other. The war between East and West Pakistan in 1971 and the rebellions in the

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\(^{17}\) Distribution of the population and resources was based on an analysis of CIA maps drawn at the time of war.
Indonesian islands in the 1950's were wars where the stakes could have been easily divided. Divisibility was coded as "moderately difficult" but not impossible if the rebels were concentrated into a distinct region but that region also possessed important resources such as oil or minerals that the central government was unlikely to easily relinquish. The Katanga province’s attempted secession from the Congo in the 1960s is a case where the stakes would have been moderately difficult to divide. Division was considered "difficult" if the populations fighting the war were intermixed throughout the country and did not occupy clear regions. Greece, Colombia, Nicaragua, Argentina, Cambodia and Laos were some of the cases included in this group. Wars where the population and resources was considered easy to divide were expected to be more likely to end in negotiated settlement than those coded as difficult.

Divisibility was thus coded in the following manner:

1  =  Easy
2  =  Moderately difficult
3  =  Difficult

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**MEDIATION:** A dummy variable indicating whether an intermediary was present during negotiations in each war.

0  =  no mediator during negotiations
1  =  mediator

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**POLPACT:** Dummy variable indicating whether a settlement offered the combatants guaranteed positions in the new government at the level of cabinet or above, or a specific quota of political power in at least one of the main branches of government, that case was coded as having a “political pact.” Zimbabwe’s Lancaster House Agreement guaranteeing twenty percent of the seats in the lower house of parliament to minority whites is an example of such a pact. A settlement that included only provisions for multi-party elections (as was the case in Angola in 1991), extended political participation to a larger share of the population (as was the case in El Salvador in 1992), or mandated political reforms (as occurred in Nicaragua in 1988), was not coded as having a “political pact” even if the resulting political changes were quite revolutionary. In such cases, warring factions would still not know the exact role they would play in the new government and their fear of political elimination would not be addressed.

Political pacts were coded in the following manner:

0  =  no political pact
1  =  political pact
MILPACT: A dummy variable indicating whether a peace settlement stipulated a quota of power in a new army. Sudan’s 1972 Addis Ababa agreement guaranteed southern rebels fifty percent representation in the southern army. Rebel and government leaders in Mozambique agreed on a new national army composed of 15,000 FRELIMO soldiers and 15,000 RENAMO soldiers. Hutu and Tutsi leaders in Rwanda agreed that government and rebel forces would merge equally to create a new 20,000 person Rwandan army. And Bosnia’s Dayton accord allowed each of the three ethnic groups to maintain their own armies. In contrast, Cambodia’s 1991 Paris peace agreement only mandated mutual troop and equipment reductions, and El Salvador’s 1992 peace agreement, while it demanded expansive military reforms and eliminated many of the government’s repressive internal security forces, did not guarantee the rebels any place in the new national military. Sudan, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Bosnia were coded as having a military pact, Cambodia, and El Salvador were not.

Military pacts were coded in the following manner:

0 = no military pact
1 = the presence of a military pact for the main combatants

TERRPACT: A dummy variable indicating whether a peace agreement included a provision for some form of regional autonomy, as was the case in Sudan in 1972 and Bosnia in 1995, if one or both sides was allowed to continue to administer areas under their control, as the royalist rebels were allowed to do in Yemen after their 1970 agreement, or if specific self-governing zones were established, as was the case in Nicaragua in 1990. All other cases were coded as including no such guarantee.

Territorial pacts were coded in the following manner:

0 = no territorial pact
1 = the presence of a territorial pact for the main combatants

GUARDUM: A dummy variable indicating the presence of a third party security guarantee. To be classified as a third-party security guarantee, outside offers had to meet two criteria. First, an outside state or international organization such as the United Nations or NATO had to step in during negotiations with a verbal or written promise to

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18 In some cases, factions were allowed to retain control over conquered territory only until elections were held or a new democratic government was formed, as was the case in the peace agreement negotiated between the Communists and Nationalists in China in 1946. Although these territorial provisions were only temporary, they were coded as “guarantees” since they offered combatants some certainty during the transition.

19 Since guarantees had to be offered by a third party, promises of amnesty and protection offered by one combatant to another were not coded as a “security guarantee.” During 1990 negotiations in Nicaragua, for example, the Sandinista government offered “to guarantee the personal security and civil rights of all returning rebels.” I did not code this offer as a security guarantee because it did nothing to reassure the rebels that they would be protected from exploitation.
verify or enforce post-treaty behavior once a settlement was signed.\textsuperscript{20} This included promises “to monitor and verify the extension of state administration throughout the country and the process of national recovery; to supervise, control and verify the disengagement of forces,” “to police the agreement,” “to deter any violators of the agreement,” “to facilitate impartially the implementation of the Agreement; to monitor and verify the ceasefire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons,” and “to ensure the overall security of the country.”\textsuperscript{21} Each one of these statements was taken to mean that the outside state or organization was willing to act as a go-between as the combatants moved forward to implement their accords.

It is important to note that this criterion does not include outside forces that are sent with the specific purpose of physically forcing a ceasefire on combatants who otherwise had no interest in pursuing peace. There were three cases (Lebanon 1976, Iraq 1991, and Tajikistan 1990’s) where outsiders imposed a peace using massive force in a situation of unresolved conflict. Syria’s 60,000 troops forced a truce on Lebanon’s largely Christian and Muslim combatants and proceeded to occupy the country. The United Nations forced a temporary truce between the Kurds and the Iraqi government by sending 17,000 troops to protect Kurdish camps against attacks by Saddam Hussein. And in Tajikistan, although no peace treaty was ever signed between the Tajik government and the Islamic Revival Party, a ceasefire continues to be enforced by 25,000 Russian soldiers. Syria, the United Nations, and Russia did bring peace to these three countries, but it was an imposed and artificial peace. To be coded as a “security guarantee” an outside force had to be offered in cases where the combatants had already decided to pursue a negotiated settlement and then only to help implement the terms the combatants themselves approved. Not all interventions, therefore, that serve to stop the fighting are by definition security guarantees.

It is also important to note that this first criterion does not include interventions designed to establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance or for the safe departure of foreign nationals and military personnel. The UN and the United States’ involvement in Somalia, for example, cannot be considered a security guarantee because it was designed to facilitate the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and not to enforce or verify any agreed-upon peace treaty. Similarly, the United Nations role in the Congo in 1960 is also not a security guarantee since it was primarily sent to ensure the safe withdrawal of Belgian forces.\textsuperscript{22}

The second criterion was more stringent. In order for an offer to be classified as a security guarantee, an outside state or international organization had to follow through with its promise and provide the expected services. Because both the government and the rebels have time to observe whether the third party arrives and how its forces are

\textsuperscript{20} This information was collected from specific guarantees written into peace treaties, from written mandates detailing the extent of outside involvement, and from case histories.

\textsuperscript{21} These phrases were taken from third party promises made, but not necessarily implemented, in Angola, Lebanon, Mozambique and Rwanda respectively.

\textsuperscript{22} There was also no peace to keep here since the combatants never signed a peace settlement.
deployed before they choose to demobilize, cases where a third party failed to arrive or arrived with a significantly reduced mandate were not coded as security guarantees. Here, both sides would know that no third party existed to help enforce or verify demobilization, and implementation would be affected accordingly.

In five cases, a third party stepped forward during negotiations to offer help with implementation but failed to provide the promised assistance. None of these promises were coded as a “third party security guarantee.” In Chad, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) promised to send an all-African peacekeeping force comprised of soldiers from Guinea, Benin and the Congo to enforce a peace settlement signed in 1979, but neither the OAU nor any member state had the money to bankroll such an operation (a fact both combatants understood) and no such force was sent. In Rwanda, Boutros Boutros-Ghali responded to a call for help during negotiations in Arusha in 1993 and promised that the United Nations would “guarantee the overall security in the country” during the implementation of the Arusha accords. The UN Security Council, however, did not authorize a mission for Rwanda until two months after the peace agreement had been signed, and then sent a force with a substantially reduced mandate and with less than half the minimum recommended number of peacekeepers. During 1991 negotiations in Angola, the United Nations promised “to prevent, verify, and investigate possible violations” of the Estoril accord but then sent only a few hundred observers who did not have the authority or the mandate to play anything more than a symbolic role in the transition. In Nagorno-Karabakh, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) agreed to commit up to 3,000 troops to police a ceasefire, but events in Bosnia and Chechnya reduced the willingness of members to participate, and Russia and Turkey disagreed over the force’s composition and command. This offer was not mentioned in subsequent negotiations. And Egypt’s pledge during Jordan’s 1970 civil war to lead "punitive action by other Arab countries to whomever violated the agreement" was also not coded as a security guarantee since President Nasser, the dominant figure in the pan-Arab movement, died the following day. His death undercut the pledge to organize Arab states and eliminated any credibility the promise might have had.

There are, of course, problems with attempting to code a security guarantee. Perhaps the most serious is this: by coding “security guarantee” based on whether a third party follows through with its promise, I ignore the effect an offer of assistance might have in getting combatants to sign a settlement (even if they do not then implement the terms). The Rwandan government and Tutsi rebels, for example, signed the Arusha accords in part because the UN had stepped in during negotiations offering to protect them during implementation. The fact that the UN failed to follow through with this promise does not mean that the offer played no role in the final outcome of the peace process. While it is true that unfulfilled promises still affect the peace process (especially combatants’ decision to sign bargains), such promises will almost certainly have no effect on combatants willingness to implement any terms since parties will have ample time to observe whether the third party arrives as promised. Coding empty promises as security

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23 Congo eventually sent 600 soldiers to Chad, but they arrived in the capital five months after the peace accord was signed, never left their barracks, and withdrew three months later when violence erupted.
guarantees, therefore, would make it almost impossible to determine the effect true guarantees would have on final implementation.

A third party security guarantee was coded in the following manner:

\[
\begin{align*}
0 & = \text{No guarantee} \\
1 & = \text{A commitment to enforce or verify the terms of demobilization}
\end{align*}
\]

**STRENGTH:** A categorical variable indicating the strength of a third party’s commitment to enforcing or verifying the peace process and its display of force. “Strength” was a function of three factors. First, was the mandate precisely defined, and was it known to the combatants signing the peace treaty? This was judged based on whether the third party guarantee was written down in the terms of the treaty itself or as a formal resolution in the guarantor’s home state or organization. The second criterion involves the type of mandate offered by the third party. Did the third party offer to send a verification mission assigned to observing and monitoring demobilization, or a more robust enforcement mission? The final criterion concerned the size of the verification or enforcement force the third party offered. In this case a minimum threshold of 500 observers was necessary for inclusion as a large verification force, and 5,000 armed soldiers for inclusion as a large peacekeeping force.\(^{24}\) This led to the following breakdown of cases:

\[
\begin{align*}
0 & = \text{No security guarantee} \\
1 & = \text{Promise to protect but mandate and force not defined.} \\
2 & = \text{Willingness to deploy a small verification mission of under 500 observers.} \\
3 & = \text{Willingness to send a large verification mission of at least 500 observers.} \\
4 & = \text{Willingness to send a small peacekeeping force of under 5,000 armed soldiers.} \\
5 & = \text{Willingness to send a large peacekeeping force of at least 5,000 armed soldiers.}^{25}
\end{align*}
\]

If the mandate and commitment was vague and ill defined, the third party guarantee was coded as the least committed of five possible guarantees. Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie’s personal guarantee to the Sudanese rebels that they would not be attacked if they signed a peace treaty in 1972 is an example of a weak security guarantee since the emperor did not specify the number of troops he would employ nor did he outline their mission. All remaining guarantees were classified as either verification missions or peacekeeping missions. If the intervening soldiers did not possess a mandate to use force, this mission was classified as a verification mission and this type of guarantee was

\(^{24}\) The primary sources consulted in the coding of this variable were United Nations peacekeeping Operations (Department of Public Information, United Nations) and individual case histories. For excellent information on UN peacekeeping missions see http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/miponuh.htm.

\(^{25}\) In this case the mandate did not have to be well-defined in order to classify as a large peacekeeping force. Such a massive commitment of forces was viewed as an unambiguous and indisputable demonstration on intent.
deemed weaker than a peacekeeping force. Both verification missions and peacekeeping missions were then divided based on the size of the force promised. Verification missions were coded as either small (if less than 500 observers were promised) or large (if more than 500 observers were promised). Peacekeeping missions were classified as either small (if less than 5,000 troops were committed) or large (if over 5,000 troops were committed).