The Logic of Ministerial Selection: Electoral System and Cabinet Appointments in Japan

Robert J. PEKKANEN, Benjamin NYBLADE and Ellis S. KRAUSS*

Does the kind of electoral system affect the type of members of parliament appointed to the cabinet in a parliamentary system? The literature on electoral reform has investigated many political consequences of changing an electoral system, but whether appointments to cabinets change too has not been investigated. Conversely, there have been many analyses of cabinet selection but they have not investigated any linkage to the type of electoral system. One reason for this is the lack of theory concerning how electoral systems impact party strategies for ministerial appointments. We suggest that the intervening factor is how parties balance their competing goals of vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking. If cabinet appointments provide an arena where parties balance these three goals, then we should observe a change in this balancing strategy, and in ministerial appointments, following the introduction of different incentives inherent in a new electoral system. To that end, we conducted an empirical test of Liberal Democratic Party cabinet appointments before and after the 1994 electoral reform. We demonstrate that the change in electoral system led the party to rebalance its priorities and consequently adapt its strategy for ministerial appointments.

Keywords: ministerial selection; cabinets; electoral reform; prime minister; political parties; LDP; legislative organization

Does the electoral system affect the type of members of parliament (MPs) appointed to the cabinet in a parliamentary system? When a country changes its electoral system would we expect to see different kinds of persons being appointed to ministerial positions? These seemingly simple questions are important ones. If electoral reform affects the type of cabinet ministers appointed, then in a parliamentary system its most important executive leadership will be transformed, and both the content and dynamics of its institutional policymaking process may be influenced.

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These questions are theoretically important because they lie at the confluence of two of the burgeoning streams of literature in political science today. On the one hand, they are embedded in the major concerns of the growing literature on the consequences of electoral reform (Scheiner 2008; Giannetti and Grofman 2011). Over the last two decades, studying the political consequences of electoral reform has become a growth industry as democracies as diverse as Japan, New Zealand, Bolivia, Italy, Ukraine and others have installed new electoral systems, in some cases multiple times. This vast literature has explored the efficacy of electoral system reform in general (Scheiner 2008; Scheiner and Tronconi 2011), its consequences in terms of ‘efficiency’, measured by responsiveness to collective-goods preferences along intra- and inter-party dimensions (Shugart 2001) and candidate nomination (DiVirgilio and Reed 2011), as well as its impact upon the distribution of votes and public resources (Hirano 2006). Many studies have further concentrated on electoral reform’s impact on women’s representation (Norris 2006).

On the other hand, there is a growing literature that considers the management of cabinet personnel, often in the context of cabinet reshuffles (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2004; Dewan and Dowding 2005; Kam and Indriðason 2005; Indriðason and Kam 2008), and that is primarily concerned with the extent to which cabinet reshuffles may serve as a mechanism for solving problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Other recent work focuses on the function of the cabinet in policymaking in a parliamentary democracy (Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011).

The work on cabinets and policymaking does not consider the full range of goals that may need to be balanced in ministerial selection, focuses only on preferences and not expertise in their model of cabinet function, assumes information to the minister to be costless, considers only policy preferences as a criteria for ministerial appointments, and models the prime minister’s selection as unconstrained by the policy preferences of the backbench. Our work will build upon the notion (Kam and Indriðason 2005) that cabinet reshuffles are an important appointment tool to raise popularity and win votes. We extend this analysis on simply ‘reshuffling’ towards a focus on the specific choice of the person to fill the (new) cabinet positions. And based on the Kam et al. (2010) argument that ministerial appointments are sensitive to the collective preferences of the backbench, we both relax assumptions about information costs and spotlight how ministerial appointments must satisfy backbencher preferences over not only policy, but also party popularity and office-seeking.

Part of the reason why these two increasingly popular streams in the political science literature have rarely been connected is that there has been little attention to exactly how electoral incentives might be connected to cabinet formation. Here we propose that the missing link is party goals, specifically that parties pursue a variety of goals related to garnering votes, making policy and securing offices (Strøm 1990). In this paper we argue that studying the selection of cabinet ministers provides an opportunity to observe how parties manage the tradeoffs among policymaking, office-seeking ambition, and their chances of electoral success, as cabinets play a crucial role in furthering all three of these goals. Conversely, because the selection of cabinet ministers is an arena where parties balance these goals, the change in incentives implicit in a new electoral system should affect party strategies for ministerial appointments. We therefore empirically test this assertion with hypotheses concerning the choices of the Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter LDP) before and after the 1994 electoral reform.

1. This specific literature on electoral reform is independent of the huge literature on the consequences of particular kinds of electoral systems in general (Moser and Scheiner 2013), a tradition that begins with Duverger.

2. Moreover, even scholarship that sees cabinet reshuffles as a solution to adverse selection (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2004) does not fully consider the various goals that may need to be balanced in ministerial selection that is one of the foci of this article.

3. To our knowledge, although Shugart, Pekkanen and Krauss (2013) do examine committee assignments in six democracies, only one article in the previous scholarship directly connects the influence of the electoral system and electoral reform with cabinet appointments (Nemoto et al. 2012), and it looks only at one MMP system (New Zealand) on the narrow question of whether ministerial appointments are used to shore up electorally vulnerable members or reward those with safe seats.
Although there has been work on how parties use committee appointments or the allocation of various posts under Japan’s Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) system (Fujimura 2013a; 2013b; Pekkanen, Nyblade, Krauss 2006) that allow the party’s members to win elections and maintain party unity, there has been little attention paid to electoral reform and ministerial appointments. Using this approach we find that a change in electoral system did lead the party to rebalance its priorities, and consequently, yielded a change in strategy for ministerial appointments.

1. Party Goals and Ministerial Selection

Strøm’s (1990) prominent model of the determinants of party behavior identifies three priorities: office-seeking, policy-seeking and vote-seeking. Parties simultaneously pursue these goals, whereas frequently scholars assume ideal-type vote-seeking, office-seeking or policy-seeking behavior. Which of these goals is the most salient or given more weight than the others will depend upon the institutional and competitive environment. Given that party leaders in parliamentary democracies usually staff cabinets, it seems natural to suggest that ministerial selection should be influenced by the goals that drive party behavior.

By what criteria might a prime minister choose ministers for her cabinet? That should depend, in part, on the goals served by ministerial appointments. Naively, we might imagine that a prime minister would choose the person ‘best suited’ for the task of governing as a minister, or at least not intentionally empower bunglers and misfits. After all, ministers head executive departments and collectively are responsible for running the government. In an ideal-type party that emphasizes only policy goals, we would expect expertise and faithful conduct to be the qualities prized above all others in ministerial appointments.

Yet, prime ministers are unlikely to be thinking only about policy. If prime ministers seek to serve the re-election interests of their party members, then they should seek to appoint ministers who will be popular with the public and improve the party’s expected performance in the next election, thus prizing popularity and name recognition in her ministers. Of course, politicians may seek more than simple re-election and may harbor ambitions for higher office. Career ambitions have long been seen as a driving force in explaining legislators’ behavior (Schlesinger 1965). As party leaders, prime ministers have incentives to use ministerial selection as a tool in managing the career ambitions of their caucus. If a party is composed of office-seeking politicians, the leader will need to focus primarily on managing the distribution of offices; typically, they will employ strategies of balancing interests and bowing to norms or rules such as respecting seniority in order to maintain the support of the backbench (Müller and Strøm 1999). A regularized system of promotion is crucial in managing internal dissent and intra-party politics (Kato 1998; Kam 2006; Nemoto, Krauss and Pekkanen 2008; Nyblade 2013).

If party goals play a major role in determining ministerial selection, what in turn influences party goals? While internal factors may play a role, most scholars have given priority to external factors (Panebianco 1988: 243, Harmel and Janda 1994), and perhaps foremost amongst these are those relating to the parties’ electoral environment. The greater the degree of electoral competitiveness,
the greater the priority placed on the pursuit of votes. When a party in government is assured of maintaining its position, it may give greater priority to enacting its policy program (however unpopular) or to enjoying the perks of office. In this paper, we focus primarily on one major ‘direct’ (Strøm 1990: 579) change to the political system—the changeover from one type of electoral system to a different one.

We believe the relationship between the electoral system and party goals strongly affects the different collective incentives that influence political parties (as represented by their leadership) on the one hand, and individual representatives within those parties, on the other. Electoral systems provide a specific set of incentives for each that must be aligned if the party is to succeed. An obvious and pertinent way to examine how electoral systems alter incentives and lead parties to rebalance their goals is to compare party behavior before and after a major electoral reform.

2. LDP Party Goals and Ministerial Selection in Japan

We examine the case of the LDP before and after the 1994 electoral reform from Single Non Transferable Vote (SNTV) to Mixed Member (MM). This electoral system change was marked enough for us to expect to see the changes in party goals reflected in ministerial appointments. As explained in the next section, we expected the electoral reform in Japan to lead to an increased emphasis in vote-seeking and policy-seeking goals and a decrease in emphasis on office-seeking. Of course, had the change been to a pure proportional representation (PR) system, or from PR to single-member districts, we might have expected quite different results. In many ways Japan’s LDP prior to electoral reform along with Italy’s Christian Democrats (hereafter, DC) were close to the ideal-type office-seeking parties (Strøm 1990: 567; Mershon 2002). Like the DC, the weakness of viable alternatives to the LDP and an electoral system that emphasized intra-party competition created an environment in which the most important political dynamics were internal to the ruling party. Management of the ambitions of MPs and internal factions was at the forefront of the challenges facing PMs in both countries (Bettcher 2005).

Japanese Prime Ministers prior to electoral reform traditionally have been viewed as being exceptionally weak in comparative perspective, due to both the factionalized party they led and the weak formal resources under their control (Uchiyama 2007; Shinoda 2013). Thus, although prime ministers held the formal power of appointing and dismissing cabinet ministers unilaterally, the importance of careful management of intra-party politics greatly constrained their ability to direct the cabinet and executive.

Much of the leverage of prime ministers is based on their position as the public face of their party and government and the influence they have on voters (Krauss and Nyblade 2005; Nyblade 2011; comparatively see Poguntke and Webb 2005). Yet prior to electoral reform the fate of individual politicians and that of the party as a whole were only weakly tied to the collective popularity of the party. Individual LDP politicians focused on developing personal support networks in their individual districts (Curtis 1971), and generally worried more about electoral competition from co-partisans than from the opposition (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Nyblade and Reed 2008). Politicians competed using local name recognition, achieving prominent positions in government and delivering pork barrel back to the local district (the ‘san-ban’ in Japanese). Aspiring party leaders who were secure in their district put effort into collecting funds for and finding other ways to support less secure politicians in their faction, thereby ensuring their loyalty in eventual competition for factional (and ultimately party) leadership.
Kam (2009) shows the extent to which keeping backbenchers content is crucial to the success of parties; the seniority system is a standard norm adopted to satisfy backbenchers ambitions. In the case of the LDP, even at its most vulnerable in the mid-1970s, party members and leaders were less worried about being voted out of power than about party splits. As politicians were not dependent on the party label for election, the threat of dissatisfied members splintering and forming their own parties was seen as the major threat to the party—quite rightly as it turns out, since the LDP finally lost power in 1993 through a party split.

Two major mechanisms that helped manage the office ambitions of LDP members were gradually institutionalized in the 1960s. First, offices came to be divided proportionally to members of the formal set of factions, which were based on loyalty to particular leaders within the party, rather than on policy or other distinctions. Second, a seniority system regularized the distribution of the various offices and posts, up to and including positions in cabinet, all of which were annually rotated. These two mechanisms served to regularize promotion and office attainment within the party effectively, if imperfectly, managing the distribution of offices (Kawato 1996a, 1996b; Kohno 1997; Krauss and Pekkanen 2011; Ramseayer and Rosenbluth 1993; Thayer 1969; Epstein et al. 1997). A third mechanism, frequent rotation of cabinet portfolios, further assuaged office-seeking pressures from individual MPs and factions.

With the electoral reform of 1994, Japan moved from a system of SNTV with medium-sized districts and in which the primary concern of LDP party members was intra-party competition, to a mixed electoral system in which intra-party competition was eliminated; party nominations to single-member districts ensured candidates exclusivity within their districts. This outcome more closely identified candidates with their party, requiring that they appeal to a broader swath of voters in the new single-member districts (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004; 2011). Because the new system was MMM with a separate single-member district vote and a second vote for list-ranked party candidates in the PR tier, the emphasis on party label was doubly reinforced in the new system. Candidates who lost in the single-member districts could be ‘revived’ and still win a seat if they were ranked high enough on the party’s PR list. All candidates needed to be concerned about their party’s performance in the PR portion because their ‘insurance’ of a revived seat might depend on it. Thus the electoral fate of both local districts and PR tier seats were de facto connected, making candidates more dependent on, and voters more aware of, party label than under the former SNTV system. Party leaders had many reasons to now worry about the party’s collective image. The prime minister and other party leaders knew that the fate of the party’s candidates and the party vote in PR, thus the party’s fate itself, were now linked inextricably to the party’s overall image with the voters.

The 1994 electoral reform greatly increased the prominence of the role of the prime minister and cabinet in Japan (Machidōri 2012), which has led to revived popular and academic interest in their influence. The electoral reforms were followed by administrative reforms that increased the institutional resources of the Japanese prime minister and cabinet.

While the electoral reforms and administrative reforms have not necessarily strengthened the leverage of every prime minister equally (Takenaka 2006; Shinoda 2013), the fate of both individual LDP politicians and the party collectively has become more dependent on the overall popular perception of the party label. This gives the party great incentive to place more emphasis on developing a reputation for effective policymaking, to collectively appeal to undecided voters, and to engage in other strategies to increase the value of the party label.

Failure to properly manage office-seeking ambitions can have a variety of devastating consequences. Frustrated MPs may vote against the party line (Kam 2006, 2009) or even leave it (Kato 1998; Nemoto et al., 2008).
One way to do this is to enhance the party label through visible appointments, such as those in the cabinet. With the greater importance of the collective reputation of the party, deviation from past practices in terms of managing intra-party office ambitions may become advantageous to the party, party leaders and even MPs who do not get offices, because their fate has become increasingly dependent on the value of the party label. For example, a former Cabinet Minister told one of the authors in an interview (Tokyo, 20 October 2008):

So you need more media oriented ministers compared to the past, of course. A segment of ministers will be appointed with those concerns factored in, the others still may be appointed on seniority basis, but if have a few ‘media-alright’ ministers, than that will help the support rate of the cabinet.

Ultimately, we should expect that with the greater importance of the party label in determining the survival and success of both individual politicians and the fate of the LDP collectively, party leaders should weigh potential vote-seeking and policy-seeking factors in choosing cabinet members, rather than relying on the proportional distribution of portfolios to factions and to members of factions via a seniority system. Below we generate specific hypotheses from this underlying theoretical perspective.

3. Hypotheses

The changed nature of electoral competition under the new electoral system suggests that the fate of individual MPs should be tied to a much greater extent to the performance and popularity of the party as a whole, responding to a new electoral environment that augments the value of party label. For LDP leaders, no longer is the central challenge to keep the party intact because individual MPs’ success at the polls now has more to do with party label. As such, this should lead an increase in the relative importance of collective policy-seeking and vote-seeking, which, unlike office-seeking goals, can build the party label. Accordingly, we expect a de-emphasis on office-seeking and an increased attention to policy- and vote-seeking to be reflected in party leaders’ selection of cabinet ministers.

Because in Japan individual office-seeking by LDP politicians was managed through factional balancing and a seniority system, we expect that following electoral reform the regularized system of office distribution will be weakened as leaders consider other factors in choosing cabinet ministers. This suggests the following hypothesis:

H1: Norms of office-management (factional balancing, factional membership, seniority, rotation) are less important in ministerial selection under MMM.

To the extent that developing a reputation for competence in policymaking and developing policies that appeal to the median voter have become more important in determining the success of the LDP post-reform, this suggests an increase in the need to place policy experts in cabinet. But what kind of policy experts? Scholars of Japanese politics broadly agree that the electoral reform should result in greater attention to public goods (PG)-oriented policies (Rosenbluth and Thies 2010: 121) and thus we would expect fewer appointments of experts in pork-barrel policies. This may be through cultivating and appointing policy experts within the party and then appointing those experts to cabinet, or through appointing non-MP experts into cabinet as necessary or expedient, as non-politicians are likely to be chosen for non-pork barrel tasks.

While in some countries such as Ireland, the United Kingdom and Japan, more than 90% of all cabinet members are MPs, in other parliamentary democracies a far greater share of portfolios are given to non-MPs with strong backgrounds in the specific policy area of their portfolio.\(^6\) Constitutional

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\(^6\) This is more common in semi-presidential and presidential systems where bargaining between parliamentary parties and the executive can lead to technocratic cabinet members as compromise solutions (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006).
rules may prohibit, require, or merely allow that cabinet ministers be elected politicians; in Japan, Article 68 of the Constitution permits up to one-half of the cabinet to be non-MPs. When policy expertise is at a premium, we expect more non-MPs to be appointed to cabinet. Similarly, MPs with greater policy expertise should become more privileged in ministerial selection, replacing those MPs who specialized in pork over policy. Thus, hypothesis 2:

H2: Policy experts (both MPs and non-MPs) will be appointed in cabinets more often under MMM.

Finally, we expect that parties driven primarily by a collective vote-seeking interest will give a greater proportion of their cabinet offices to ‘popular’ people, or more specifically those who will have a greater chance of improving the value of the party label and vote-garnering ability of the party. Parties that have weaker collective vote-seeking incentives will place less weight on choosing ministers according to their expected influence on electoral fortunes. Parties in government wish to remain in government, so they need to ensure their continued success in elections. This vote-seeking goal may increasingly be a factor in the selection of party leaders and prime ministers (Poguntke and Webb 2005), and a similar logic may apply to cabinet ministers whose prominence in the media may help sustain a party’s collective electoral support. The greater role of television in elections in Japan in recent years (Krauss and Nyblade 2005; Taniguichi 2007) should reinforce the incentives to appoint popular and well-known figures to the cabinet for vote-seeking.

Systematically identifying such politicians is a challenge in academic work. Electoral strength within a district is not necessarily indicative of national-level popularity, so relying simply on vote margins is problematic. However, we can suggest one hypothesis to test whether such vote-seeking concerns have become more important under the mixed member system. We suggest:

H3: Women are more likely to be chosen as cabinet ministers post-reform.

The new MM system creates the need to appeal to broad segments of society in order to win seats. The appointment of female ministers can be an attempt by LDP leaders to appeal to a broader public and to garner greater media attention ((Kobayashi 2004). Women in Japan have been a distinct constituency whose political loyalties over time have changed and in the 1990s were identified as an important set of swing voters (Martin 2004). More generally, the list PR system should make it more likely that parties will strategically choose legislative candidates and ministers more representative of society than in a local district system (Norris 1997: 309; Reynolds 1999). Around the world, countries adopting PR have increased the representation of women and other minorities in legislative elections (Salmond 2006). Indeed, improving minority group representation is one of the most frequently cited goals in adopting mixed electoral rules around the world (Vowles et al., 1998: 136). We recognize that there may be other reasons for democratic countries to increase female representation in the cabinet but we consider some of these and deal with the convoluted problem of multi-causality for this hypothesis below.

4. Alternative Explanations

Before testing our hypotheses, we also need to consider possible alternatives that might better explain any changes in ministerial selection we find. We can think of several types of alternative explanations: broad-based social changes, changes in the media, and the idiosyncratic influence of particular prime ministers. We review these individually below, but first note that one of the strengths of our theoretical approach is that it provides a systematic explanation for a variety of potential changes in ministerial selection in Japan, whereas the alternative explanations generally focus on only one or two.
Furthermore, and crucially for our empirical strategy, our argument suggests a break in the nature of Cabinet appointments before and after electoral reform. Note, however, that the possible alternative explanations suggest either change as a gradual trend, or idiosyncratic variation by individual prime ministers. Thus a key focus of empirical work is to show that the changes we identify occur as a break, more suddenly at the predicted juncture of electoral reform, rather than as a trend or due to idiosyncratic differences amongst prime ministers.

An important broad-based social change in Japan has occurred in the perception and attitudes toward women in consequential and prominent positions in both the public and private spheres. The ‘revolution’ in gender roles and attitudes toward them, especially of the 1960s and 1970s, brought about a major, if yet not adequate, expansion in the positions to which women were deemed to be able to compete, and for which they were seen as qualified. Could not any findings that there are more women appointed to the cabinet simply be a reflection of such change rather than a consequence of electoral system change?

Another important broad-based social change is in the nature of policy issues on the political agenda, which has changed dramatically in the past quarter-century. Policy issues more frequently are complex and cut across traditionally defined fields, creating greater need for policy coordination and thus policy expertise at the highest levels of government. Thus, rather than changes in ministerial selection reflecting the changing priorities parties place on different goals, it could be that parties have the same balance amongst goals, but it simply became harder to achieve one of those goals, leading to a change in ministerial selection.

Furthermore, the nature and role of the mass media in Japanese politics has also changed dramatically in recent decades, as we noted above. The rising importance of television and new types of media coverage in politics might lead to the appointment of popular ministers who were more likely to have a media appeal. Of course, this may partly put the cart before the horse, since for such a media change to matter requires that the party place priority on its collective popularity over managing competing intra-party office ambitions.

As noted above, although these broad-based social transformations and the evolution of the media undoubtedly have occurred in Japan, these changes have occurred gradually over time, rather than a pre-reform/post-reform break in the data. If we find significant changes before and after electoral reform but no clear time trend, one would be hard put to argue that these alternative explanations based upon gradual trends would apply.

A different sort of alternative hypothesis might rest on the notion that prime ministerial idiosyncrasies drive any differences we see in pre- and post-reform ministerial selection. Thus scholarly work and popular press has suggested that PM Koizumi was idiosyncratic in his administration and his appointments of cabinet ministers (Otake 2006). Again, however, the influence of a particular prime minister can be considered and controlled for in analysis of the data.

More generally, one of the contributions we make is that our theoretical approach provides a framework for understanding a number of generalizable and distinct changes in ministerial selection, whereas the alternative explanations that have been suggested focus on only one facet of ministerial selection or are non-generalizable. And as our analyses below suggest, the differences in Japanese cabinet appointments in the two periods examined cannot be explained as gradual trends or as the idiosyncratic choices of any prime minister.

5. Evidence

We expect that the selection of LDP cabinet ministers since 1996 has no longer been driven primarily by the imperatives of managing internal party politics through the strategic distribution of offices amongst
parties, but instead has come to represent the greater importance that the party places on vote-seeking and policy-influencing behavior in the cabinet. This suggests a decline in the importance of the seniority system and factional balancing in determining portfolio allocation, and an increase in the importance of appointing prominent, popular cabinet members who can help increase the overall vote share of the LDP, and policy-specialist cabinet members who can improve the party’s policymaking ability. Below we test our hypotheses with data comparing Japanese cabinet ministers before and after electoral reform.

Our data source is primarily a database that has the positions held by all LDP MPs from 1980–2009, including cabinet positions and other party, parliamentary, and governmental posts, characteristics of the MPs (including gender and hereditary status, age, seniority, etc.), the electoral districts and characteristics, vote margins, and so forth.7

5.1. Descriptive Comparisons

While most of our hypotheses concern various characteristics that influence the likelihood of an LDP House of Representatives (HoR) MP being chosen as a cabinet minister, some of the implications of two of our hypotheses do not. Two implications of our argument are for factional balancing and the selection of non-MP cabinet ministers, which are at different levels of analysis. We consider them separately in this section in a somewhat more descriptive fashion, before turning to multivariate statistical analyses.

Our first hypothesis suggests that LDP internal party norms regarding ministerial selection (factions, balancing, the seniority system, etc.) have weakened. In particular, a decline in the strictness of the formula of factional balancing the LDP developed for the allocation of scarce office benefits should suggest that considerations other than factional politics have become more important in ministerial selection. Although, as Park (2001) notes, factional politics continued to play an important role in ministerial selection through the first five years following the introduction of the new electoral system, there is still a clear break in the proportionality of ministerial appointments between the 1980–1993 period and even the early years of the 1996–2009 period, consistent with our first hypothesis.

Table 1 reports key data for every cabinet included in our two periods8, including a proportionality index that compares the balance of cabinet seats held by MPs from a specific faction relative to that faction’s strength amongst LDP HoR MPs. This proportionality index is an aggregate measure of the differences between faction seat shares in the Diet and the faction’s share of cabinet portfolios, with complete disproportionality reflected with a 0 and perfect proportionality normalized to 1.

During the 1980–1993 period, factional proportionality in ministerial allocation was quite high, ranging from 84% to 91%. Most of the remaining disproportionality can be attributed to the fact that there were only 21 portfolios in each cabinet, so perfect proportionality is unlikely. However between 1996–2005 only one cabinet—Obuchi’s first—even ascends to the low end of this range (85%); the vast bulk of the proportionality scores are between 60% and 80% after reform. Overall, the average proportionality drops from 87% to 75% between the two periods. The data suggests a clear break in proportionality between the pre-reform and post-reform cabinets rather than a gradual trend or a result driven solely by PM Koizumi.

7. The J-LOD (Japan Legislative Organization Database) constructed by Krauss and Pekkanen. The primary source for the database is Seiji Handobukku (Tokyo: Seiji Kôhó Senta-, various years) and Seikan Yôran (Tokyo: Seisaku Jihô, various years.

8. Table 1 includes new cabinets and major reshuffles. We follow Kam and Indriðason (2005) in their definition of reshuffles as a change in cabinet membership in which more than two ministers change. New cabinets and major reshuffles cover over 95% of cabinet appointments in Japan. Mori 1 is excluded because, as Mori ascended to PM upon Obuchi’s death and did not reshuffle the cabinet, it does not qualify under our definition of a new or reshuffled cabinet. Similarly, Abe’s second cabinet was largely identical to Fukuda’s first, so we treat them as a single cabinet.
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Another aspect of our argument that cannot be considered in our multivariate analyses is the suggestion that non-MP policy experts should be more likely to be chosen as cabinet members in the post-reform period. This is another strong sign that appeasing the internal office-seeking ambitions of MPs has given way to other concerns, as granting cabinet posts to non-MPs removes them as a

Table 1. Japanese Cabinet Membership and Factional Proportionality.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Cabinet</th>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Non-MPsa</th>
<th>Proportionalityb (%)</th>
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<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>85</td>
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<tr>
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<td>89</td>
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<td>27 December 1982</td>
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<td>Aso</td>
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aTakenaka Heizo was elected to the House of Councillors in 2004 and thus is not counted as a non-MP in Koizumi 4 or Koizumi 5.
bPerfect proportionality is 1, perfect disproportionality is 0; the proportionality index is calculated as follows: \[ 1 - \frac{1}{2} \sum |C_i - S_i| \]
where \( C_i \) is the share of cabinet seats held by faction \( i \) and \( S_i \) is the share of seats held by faction \( i \); the index is intended to measure factional proportionality only, and thus excludes cabinet seats that go to non-MPs or MPs who do not belong to an LDP faction.

Another aspect of our argument that cannot be considered in our multivariate analyses is the suggestion that non-MP policy experts should be more likely to be chosen as cabinet members in the post-reform period. This is another strong sign that appeasing the internal office-seeking ambitions of MPs has given way to other concerns, as granting cabinet posts to non-MPs removes them as a
possible reward to MPs. Consistent with our expectations, there has been a dramatic increase in ‘non-
partisan’ cabinet ministers. The most prominent example is that of Takenaka Heizō, a 50-year old
professor with a distinguished academic career in economics whom Koizumi appointed to multiple
cabinets, but his case is hardly unusual in the post-reform period. While overall, in the 44 cabinets
between 1955 and 1993, there were only seven non-MPs appointed to cabinet (0.9% of appoint-
ments), and just two between 1980 and 1993 (0.6%), there were seven different cabinet members
who were non-MPs appointed between 1996 and 2009, a majority of whom served in three or more
cabinets. Overall, non-MPs represent 6% of appointments during the 1996–2009 period, a six-fold
increase from the 1955–1993 period, and an increase of 10 times from the 1980–1993 period.

5.2. Multivariate Analyses
Similar descriptive comparisons can be made for our remaining predictions across the two periods. However, as all of them provide predictions about how different characteristics of LDP MPs influence their likelihood of being selected as cabinet ministers in the 1980–1993 and 1996–2005 periods, they can be tested jointly and more directly against alternative hypotheses in a multiple regression frame-
work. Our sample includes all LDP HoR politicians in the two periods, and our dependent variable is selection as a minister in a new cabinet or major reshuffle. With a dichotomous outcome variable, we have relied on simple logistic regression, although re-running our analyses using the rare-events logistic regression technique suggested by King and Zeng (2001) does not alter our results.

To test Hypothesis 1 about the declining importance of LDP norms of office management, we incorporate several variables in our model. We include a dummy variable equal to 1 for LDP HoR MPs that are not members of a faction, expecting to find a much greater ‘penalty’ to LDP MPs not in a faction under SNTV than under MMM. We include a set of dummy variables for the number of terms MPs served in the HoR, as the effect of seniority is non-monotonic. To consider the importance of the rotation of cabinet positions, we include variables for whether the MP held a ministerial post in the prior cabinet. However, as the differences in the rotation of ministers have varied dramatically by the type of post, we split this lagged minister variable into three sets of posts by issue area: high policy (HP), PG and distributive (Pekkanen, et al., 2006: 189).

9. Even though already dramatically low, these numbers are actually inflated by a technicality. The list of non-MP Ministers includes Kiichi Miyazawa, a career politician who would later become PM. He was in-between serving in the House of Councillors and running for the HoR when he began serving as Secretary of the Economic Planning Agency; he was then elected to the HoR three months into his term in Cabinet.

10. The data would be even more striking had Takenaka not run for and won a HoC position in 2004. Although clearly a policy specialist and with subsequent presence in Cabinet, which is consistent with our argument, Takenaka is not counted as a non-MP policy specialist in our data after that point.

11. The simple bivariate pre-reform and post-reform comparisons for our variables of interest are quite stark, but in order to save space we report them only in supplementary documentation available from the authors.

12. During both periods we consider, 6% of LDP HoR members were selected as a cabinet member during formation of a new cabinet or major reshuffles.

13. In the 1980–1993 period three-fourths of repeat cabinet ministers held one of four portfolios: Prime Minister, Finance, Foreign Affairs and Chief Cabinet Secretary. Half of ministers in these four portfolios returned following a reshuffle, while less than 4% of all other ministers remained in cabinet following a reshuffle. In the 1996–2009 period, the ‘return rate’ for ministers in those same four portfolios was roughly the same, but the rate for other portfolios nearly quadrupled. We follow the trichotomous division of types of posts suggested by Pekkanen et al. (2006), in order to provide a more nuanced test and see which type of cabinet posts are and are not being rotated in the two periods. For more on the importance of distinguishing between different types of cabinet ministers, see Epstein et al. (1997).
Consideration of Hypothesis 2 is more difficult, as MP policy expertise is difficult to assess systematically. For our analyses we rely on a fairly simple relative measurement of experience: the weighted proportion of party, legislative and executive leadership posts an MP has held that are widely recognized as being primarily about distributive politics, using the same categorization of types of post as in the previous hypothesis.\textsuperscript{14} This measure captures the extent to which the politician has specialized in ‘pork’ as opposed to policy. Overall the proportion of distributive posts has not changed between the two periods (in both periods 40% of the posts held by LDP politicians are in distributive areas). One disadvantage of this measure is that it forces us to exclude the LDP MPs who have yet to hold a leadership post in the party from any analyses including the variable. However, as almost all MPs hold lower level leadership posts before entering cabinet, this does not actually alter our results substantially, as we show by reporting results that both include and exclude this variable.

To test Hypothesis 3, which suggests that women should be more likely to be selected as ministers post-reform, we include a dummy variable indicating which LDP HoR MPs are women. As there are no LDP HoR MPs who are women in the 1980–1993 period, when the two periods are separated we do not include a gender variable for the earlier period. This also means we cannot directly compare the two periods for this hypothesis, we simply test the effect of sex in the post-reform period. We recognize that this is a second-best alternative but the only one available to us given the lack of women in the earlier period.

We also include several control variables. First, we include dummy variables for whether the LDP politician is the child or grandchild of a prominent politician (one who served in a prior Cabinet) and whether the LDP politician was the child or grandchild of any other politician. Popular accounts have noted an increase in the proportion of hereditary politicians in Japan in cabinet, particularly in the Koizumi cabinets. An increase in the likelihood of hereditary politicians in cabinet is consistent with our framework, as many of the hereditary politicians chosen have prominent names and national reputations. However, as discussed earlier, given the difficulty in coming up with a suitable measure for national reputation, it is a rough proxy at best for our actual concept of interest. Although we do not consider it a strong test of our argument, we include the variable as a control to ensure that the results we do consider more direct tests of our argument are robust to the inclusion of indicators for hereditary politicians.

Second, we include a dummy variable coded one for MPs with prior experience in the House of Councillors (HoC), as those who have HoC experience can get a portion of that credited to their seniority in the HoR. Third, we include a variable for age and age squared, as the common wisdom about cabinet appointments suggests that both very young and very old MPs may be less likely to serve in cabinet. Finally, we include a variable that considers the vote margin an MP has in their district, as well as vote-margin squared, as Kataoka (1989) and more recently Pekkanen et al. (2006) have suggested that the LDP may allocate posts in order to influence the electoral prospects of individual MPs.\textsuperscript{15}

Table 2 reports our main results. We report two models, both of which include both periods, and include each variable interacted with a dummy variable capturing period. Coefficients in the first column of each model capture the effect of a variable during the 1980–1993 period, while coefficients

\textsuperscript{14} We incorporate a minor weighting of the offices by importance of the post: chairs of committees and ministers are given twice the weight as vice-chairs or vice-ministers, however the results are not sensitive to this weighting.

\textsuperscript{15} Excluding vote margin would allow us to increase our sample size, because ‘PR Only’ MPs in the post-reform period are necessarily excluded. However, the results for the other variables do not change when the analyses are run including PR Only MPs and excluding vote margin.
### Table 2. Determinants of Ministerial Selection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Reform</td>
<td>Post-Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.73 (0.44)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Faction</td>
<td>−0.85 (0.40)**</td>
<td>−0.30 (0.31) **</td>
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<td>Distributive Posts %</td>
<td>−0.85 (0.40)**</td>
<td>−0.30 (0.31) **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distributive Minister Lag</td>
<td>−1.22 (0.52) **</td>
<td>0.67 (0.38) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HP Minister Lag</td>
<td>1.25 (0.27) **</td>
<td>0.94 (0.30) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PG Minister Lag</td>
<td>−0.04 (0.45)</td>
<td>0.24 (0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms 1–3</td>
<td>−3.69 (0.44) **</td>
<td>−3.01 (0.42) **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terms 4–5</td>
<td>−1.38 (0.21) **</td>
<td>−0.63 (0.25) **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terms 7+</td>
<td>−0.54 (0.18) **</td>
<td>0.14 (0.24)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hereditary</td>
<td>0.02 (0.15)</td>
<td>0.36 (0.18) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoC Experience</td>
<td>0.57 (0.31) *</td>
<td>0.38 (0.31)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vote Margin</td>
<td>0.09 (0.03) **</td>
<td>0.04 (0.02) **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vote Margin2</td>
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<td>−0.001 (.0003) **</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>−0.002 (.001) *</td>
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Note: *P < 0.10 and **P < .05 (two-tailed tests).
in the second column capture the effects of the variables in the 1996–2009 period. The third column reports the significance level of any difference between the coefficients for the two periods, as appropriate. All significance levels reported are for two-tailed tests, although this under-reports our confidence in results consistent with our directional predictions. The first model includes our full sample but excludes our measure of MP policy specialization (the weighted percent of leadership posts an MP has held in a distributive politics field), whereas the second model includes the policy specialization measure and thus excludes MPs with no previous party, legislative or executive leadership posts. As the results for the variables of interest are consistent across the two models, we discuss the major findings of the two models together below, and all calculations reported are based on Model 2.

Consistent with our first hypothesis, lack of factional membership significantly decreases an MP's probability of being selected as a cabinet minister in the first period, but post-reform there is no statistically significant discrimination against MPs not in factions. Simulating the likelihood of a typical MP in each period\(^{16}\) being chosen for cabinet in each period, lack of factional membership drops the predicted probability from 18.7% to 8.6% in the first period, but only from 10.5% to 8.4% in the second period.\(^{17}\)

The analyses also find support for the contention that seniority is less important in explaining ministerial selection since electoral reform. In the first period, all MPs below sixth term are significantly less likely to be selected as a cabinet minister, when compared to a sixth-term MP (the excluded category), as are more senior LDP politicians (Terms 7+). This is consistent with a highly regularized seniority system in which a cabinet post is the ‘prize’ received in a politician’s sixth term (Kohno 1997; Epstein et al. 1997), after which most MPs are rotated out of cabinet posts. In the post-reform period, while junior politicians remain less likely to enter cabinet (although to a lesser degree than under SNTV), senior politicians are no less likely than sixth-term politicians to enter cabinet. Overall, the differences in the coefficients on the seniority variable are significant between the two periods at conventional confidence levels, and the overall explanatory power of the seniority dummy variables declines dramatically in the second period.

In the 1996–2009 period there is also evidence of an increase in ministers retaining their cabinet position in new or reshuffled cabinets. We split cabinet posts into three different types related to their policy sectors: distributive, HP, and PG. The increase occurs primarily in the distributive ministerial posts (Trade and Industry, Construction, Agriculture, etc.). Being in a distributive ministerial post dramatically decreases an MP’s likelihood of being chosen for the next cabinet in the 1980–1993 period, consistent with the intra-party need to rotate these highly valuable ‘patronage’-linked posts. However, in the 1996–2009 period, being in a distributive cabinet post significantly increases one’s likelihood of being chosen for the next cabinet. However, there is no significant evidence of rotation or retention of PG ministers in either period, and the greater probability of a HP minister declines slightly in the second period.

Our policy specialization variable works as expected, providing clear support for the argument that being a policy expert (rather than a specialist in pork) is more valuable in garnering a ministerial post in the post-reform period. MPs that primarily specialized in distributive politics were significantly more likely to be chosen as a cabinet minister in the pre-reform period, whereas they were

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16. An MP in his sixth term of median age (56), and vote margin (5.1 in the 1980–1993 period, 14.9 in the 1996–2009 period). All subsequent calculations use this `typical` MP except as noted.
17. Although overall the probability of being chosen as a minister are almost identical between the two periods, the baseline probabilities are quite different for the typical sixth-term MP (18.7% pre-reform vs. 10.5% post-reform). This is due to the overall decline in the predictive power of seniority in the post-reform period.
significantly less likely to be chosen as a cabinet minister in the second period. An MP who specialized entirely in distributive politics was 7.8 percentage points more likely to be chosen for cabinet than one who specialized entirely in other sorts of policy areas (23.7% vs. 15.9%) while they were 4.7 percentage points less likely to be in cabinet in the second period (7.9% vs. 12.6%), all else equal.

There is also some support for our final hypothesis, although perhaps it is not as clear as for the first two. Female MPs in the 1996–2005 period are significantly more likely to be chosen as cabinet ministers than their male counterparts—the predicted probability is that they are nearly four times as likely to be chosen for cabinet (36.3% vs. 10.5%). We cannot directly compare this to the pre-reform period as there were no female LDP HoR members in the period, but the significant gender difference post-reform is consistent with our predictions for the post-reform period. Of course, once a few women were appointed to the cabinet the first time, it might be difficult for a party to then eliminate them completely from those positions afterwards. This itself however may indicate the party’s desire to appoint popular ministers such as women to appeal to a particular strata of voters.

When considering the impact of our control variables, we find that their coefficients are much as expected. While being a hereditary politician has no effect on the probability of being chosen for cabinet in the pre-reform period, hereditary politicians are more likely to be chosen as a cabinet minister in the post-reform period, although the effect is on the edge of standard measures of statistical significance. Prior experience in the House of Councillors has a positive impact on the probability of selection as a minister in both periods, although this is not as significant in the second period. Age has a curvilinear effect on the probability of becoming a minister, but the relationship half the impact and is only marginally significant in the second period. The margin by which an MP wins his or her district has a strictly positive (for actual values of the variables of interest) and significant effect in the first period, and a weaker and less significant effect in the second, although the differences between the two periods are not significant.

The results in Table 2 support our argument. However, the model does not directly test our hypotheses against the major alternative explanations, which suggest that these results could be driven by the idiosyncrasies of individual prime ministers or by broader societal trends. We consider these alternative possibilities by re-running our model on rolling sub-samples of the data, each sub-sample including five cabinets. Figure 1 reports the coefficients of key independent variables for pre-reform and post-reform cabinets, with the label at the bottom representing the middle of each five cabinet sample. We examine the changes in coefficients over time, and before and after electoral reform to consider whether breaks identified in the model reported in Table 2 might be the result of idiosyncrasies of individual cabinets or secular trends that are unrelated to the reform.

The panels on the left in Figure 1 report the coefficients for pre-reform sub-samples, while panels on the right report the coefficients for post-reform sub-samples. The first pair of panels show the coefficients across sub-samples for two key variables. The solid black line, which is intermittently missing, represents the coefficient for the ‘No Faction’ dummy variable. The line is missing in sub-samples in which no MP who had no factional affiliation was chosen for cabinet. This includes nearly half of the sub-samples in the earlier period, and the first two sub-samples in the second period. Consistent with our argument, there is no clear sense of a trend in the coefficient, rather there simply

18. Full results for the models on which Figure 1 are used, as well as several alternative statistical tests for trends and idiosyncratic factors are included in the appendix. We include five cabinets in our sub-sample as the relatively small number of ministers in each cabinet creates more volatile (and suspect) single-cabinet coefficients.
appears to be a substantial break in the two periods. On the other hand, the coefficient on our policy specialization variable declines somewhat in the pre-reform period, suggesting the positive effect of specializing in distributive politics areas declined over the 1980s. However, the positive effect of being a specialist in non-distributive policy areas is only found under MMM. While there appears to be some significant idiosyncratic short-term or PM-specific effects for the effect of policy specialization, our results overall are robust to controlling for PM effects for this variable.19

The second set of panels in Figure 1 show the coefficients for our rotation variables. As with most of the other variables, there is only weak evidence of a pre-reform trend in the rotation of ministers. However, the pre-reform trend is in the incorrect direction to explain the key finding about rotation we report in Table 2, as rotation appears to decline somewhat over this period. Following electoral reform, there is a trend towards the increasing retention of all ministers, which peaks with the five Koizumi cabinets and somewhat subsides thereafter. However, despite a clear ‘Koizumi effect’ on ministerial rotation, the significant difference in the rotation of distributive ministers reported in Table 2 is robust and significant even if we exclude the Koizumi cabinets, suggesting that the decrease in rotation in these crucial distributive ministerial posts is not explicable by broader trends or a specific Koizumi effect.

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19. The bulk of the pre-reform decline in the coefficient for this variable is driven by ministerial selection by the three Kaifu cabinets, which were appointed following a series of major corruption scandals and were specifically intended to present a ‘clean’ face of the party. In the post-reform period, the negative effect of specialization in distributive politics was greatest under the Hashimoto, Obuchi and Mori cabinets, which were pursuing a series of politician-led political and structural reforms, whereas the subsequent Koizumi and post-Koizumi cabinets seemed to incorporate a greater degree of vote-seeking concerns.
In sum, the key empirical findings are robust to alternative arguments that our results are primarily due to idiosyncratic choices by individual prime ministers or to general social or political trends over the last 30 years. Overall, we find clear support for our hypotheses concerning the factors that influence selection of LDP cabinet ministers: in the post-reform period, less emphasis is placed on seniority and factional considerations, while greater importance is given to policy expertise and characteristics that may play well in the press and with voters. Altogether, we believe they support the argument that the electoral system change led the party to alter its priorities and the balance it placed on party goals, as reflected in ministerial appointments.

6. Conclusion

Our research suggests that consideration of the relationship between ministerial selection and party goals can improve the study of both. We can better understand ministerial selection by considering the tradeoffs that parties are forced to make between policy, office and votes. Ministerial selection, on the other hand, provides an almost ideal opportunity to evaluate party goals, as it is a clear arena in which party goals conflict that also allows for systematic data collection.

Electoral systems clearly influence how ministers are chosen for cabinet. The LDP changed the manner in which it selects cabinet ministers in response to the new electoral system introduced in 1994. The highly regularized system of appointment to cabinet positions based on norms of seniority, factional distribution, and rotation of posts severely eroded. MPs with policy expertise and even non-MP policy experts have been appointed to cabinets much more frequently, as the LDP seeks to build up policy expertise in the cabinet. At the same time, women have gained a more substantial presence in Cabinet. This reflects downgrading office-seeking goals and placing a greater emphasis on vote-seeking and policy-seeking goals.

This is also significant because it is one of the first tests to confirm with systematic quantitative data the suggestion that parties will adapt their goals when the political environment changes (Strom 1990; Müller and Strom 1999). Although the challenges of ministerial selection may not be identical to other arenas of party behavior, we think it is representative enough to provide important insights into how a governing party’s priorities may adapt to a new electoral environment: as one area in which party goals frequently cut at cross-purposes, ministerial selection is conceptually and empirically an excellent venue to systematically evaluate the changes in a party’s behavioral priorities.

The changes in ministerial selection hold broad implications for Japanese politics and policymaking. For the first time, the cabinet itself has served as the locus for serious policy contention. And indeed, disputes have even escalated to the point that ministers have left or been sacked from the cabinet, or major clashes have occurred when politicians appointed especially to fulfill ‘vote-seeking’ goals clashed with the prime minister, other more ‘expert’ ministers, or with their bureaucracies. If one of the aims of the electoral reform in Japan was to enhance electoral competition and the importance of policy competition rather than the personal vote, then our findings suggest that the reform has had some success in shifting the emphasis toward policy-seeking and vote-seeking, away from office-seeking.

As one of our referees pointed out, there might also be a ‘precedent effect,’ or the possibility that once a woman had been appointed to the cabinet, it established a precedent that pressured further appointments to avoid a retrograde image. We cannot rule this out, but believe that such a development would be closely linked to the electoral-system-driven need we hypothesize to appoint women to cultivate party image.
Moreover, our findings have implications beyond the specific case of electoral reform in Japan; further comparative research is essential in analyzing the consequences of electoral systems and electoral reform. With many countries adopting new electoral systems in the past two decades, there are many opportunities to test whether electoral reform elsewhere has similarly influenced ministerial selection. Although our study concerned a transition from SNTV to MMM, we believe our research design can also be applied to the effect of electoral reform or other institutional interventions on party goals and ministerial selection generally.

References


